ࡱ>  R,bjbj8ּIf f ^D8  l[,I#I#I#I#I#888[[[[[[[^`B[8A8^888[QQI#I#[FFF8DQ2I#I#[F8[FF$Rh`SI#F>@RZ[0[R`D\` `S`S&`Sx88F88888[[F888[8888`888888888f  u: Love me, Love My Dog: An Experimental Study on Social Connections and Indirect Reciprocity Pinghan Liang(RIEM, SWUFE)Juanjuan Meng(Guanghua, Peking University)Abstract: This paper conducts a laboratory experiment to investigate the underlying behavioral motivations of indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity refers to the situation that upon receiving help from a donor the recipient is willing to repay to a third party. We employ naturally occurring friendship to study social connections, thus, a beneficiary might either be a friend or a stranger of a donor. We demonstrate that knowing the social connections significantly increase the recipients repayment only if the donor is kind enough at the first place. On the other hand, if the donor is allowed send a message to the recipient asking for favorable treatment on the beneficiary, it is shown that the repayment remains the same regardless whether a message is delivered. Major theories of reciprocity, e.g., fairness, intention-based, guilt-aversion, cannot offer satisfactory explanations of our findings. We propose an explanation based on in-group and out-group differences but with endogenous group status, in which social connections play a crucial role. Key words: indirect reciprocity, social connections, groupIntroductionIt is well established that individuals usually exhibit reciprocal behavior in bilateral relationships even in the absence of any contractual requirements or future interactions (Berg et al, 1995; McCabe et al, 1998). As in the investment game (Berg et al, 1995), this reciprocal tendency, though violate narrowly-defined individual rationality, often improves social welfare. However, in reality the possibility of reciprocating to others kindness directly could be limited, because the high frequency of anonymous interactions in modern society makes the donor untraceable. As a consequence, to sustain mutual cooperation in a large group, it is crucial that there exists wide-spread indirect reciprocity, i.e., upon receiving others help, the recipient is willing to reciprocate to a third party who didnt help him before. Indirect reciprocity can be motivated by various reasons, including strategic or behavioral ones. The existing literature has primarily focused on strategic incentives such as reputation-building (Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005; Seinen and Schram, 2006). Such strategic motives rely on repeated interaction and information transmission. However, it has been shown that indirect reciprocity exists even in one-shot interaction (Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth, et al., 2001; Buchan et al., 2002; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009). This finding significantly expands the scope for indirect reciprocity to maintain mutual cooperation in large groups, where information transmission is either too noisy or too slow to effectively build up reputation. However, the underlying motivations of indirect reciprocity in one-shot game remain unclear. This paper takes a step forward to investigate the behavioral motives of indirect reciprocity. We hypothesize that one driving force of non-strategic indirect reciprocity is social connection, i.e. the social relations between the donor and the third party. Many life examples suggest our hypothesis: It is common to see people becoming nicer to a stranger if they learn that the stranger is friend of somebody who happened to help them before. The business partners of a family corporate founder are more willing to help the founders kin heir than an outsider. The operations of political dynasties in some democracies including Japan, Philippines rely on that voters are willing to elect the heir of the politician who did favor to them before. Previous economics studies suggest that social connections are valuable because of facilitating information sharing and contract enforcement (e.g. Greif, 1994; Kranton, 1996; Jackson, 2008). But if our hypothesis is supported, then the value of social connections is greatly enhanced because the more people you connect to, the more benefits you may be able to collect from your friends kindness behavior. There are many theories of reciprocity in bilateral setting that can be naturally extended to the case of indirect reciprocity. We would like to test whether factors addressed in these theories also play a role when reciprocal behavior is indirect. In particular, we test whether the recipient cares about fairness outcome as in outcome-based social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002), whether the selfish or altruistic type of the third party is important (Levine, 1998; Strassmair,2009; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2010) and whether the recipient wants to avoid disappointing the donor (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Our laboratory experiment extends the standard investment game/trust game to a multilateral setting. In this game a donor can choose to transfer certain amount to a recipient, and this amount will be tripled. The recipient then decides how much to repay to a randomly re-paired beneficiary. We run three treatments: The Baseline, Friend and Message Treatments. The game design in the Baseline Treatment is the same as just described above. In the Friend Treatment, only the recipient (not the donor) is informed whether the donor and the beneficiary were friends. In the Message Treatment, the donor could send a costly message to the recipient asking for nice treatment on the beneficiary. We observe significant amount of repayment in all treatments, which suggest considerable non-strategic pure indirect reciprocal behavior. After controlling for the amount of initial transfer, the Friend Treatment shows significant impact of social connections on indirect reciprocity. Knowing that the donor and the beneficiary are friend increases the repayment from the recipient only if the donors initial transfer is high. The most prominent existing theories of social preferences, e.g., outcome-based, intention-based, type-based and guilty-aversion, are not be able to provide a convincing explanation of the observed reciprocal behavior. Therefore, by extending Malmendier and Schmidt (2011), we propose an explanation based on in-group and out-group differences of social preferences but with endogenous group formation and transitive social connections. High initial transfer creates social ties between donors and recipients, when the donor and the beneficiary has closer social distance, the kindly treated recipient cares the beneficiarys welfare more, and repay more to her. We could not find any significant effect of message sending in the Message Treatment, suggesting that the donors expectations is not particularly relevant for the recipients indirect reciprocal behavior. Our experimental results cast doubts on the role of recipients belief in indirect reciprocal behavior.This paper is related to several lines of research. As mentioned before, most literature on reciprocity focuses on bilateral interactions, and papers investigating indirect reciprocity often do so in the context of repeated interactions. Only a few papers isolate pure indirect reciprocity in one-shot interaction. Dufwenberg et al. (2001), Guth et al. (2001) and Buchan et al. (2002) have developed a one-shot four-person investment game, in which two pairs of donor and recipient consist a group. Instead of reciprocating to their own donors, the recipients could only repay to the donor previously not matched with. These papers demonstrate the existence of indirect reciprocity even in the absence of incentives for strategic reputation building. Guth et al. (2001) and Buchan et al. (2002) also report that the amount of reciprocity under indirect interaction is smaller than that under bilateral interaction. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the intrinsic motivations underlying pure indirect reciprocity. Previous studies have found the important role of social distance in bilateral setting. A variety of methods are implemented to manipulate the social distance in laboratory, e.g., wording on the instructions (Hoffman et al. 1996; Buchan et al, 2002), revelation of the names of players (Charness and Gneezy, 2008), hypothetic social distances (Buchan and Croson, 2004), naturally occurring friends like Chinese undergraduate classmates (Song et al, 2012), etc.. The most common experimental manipulation employed is ad hoc group discussion procedure, in which participants are randomly assigned to different groups to discuss an assigned topic for a short time period (Buchan et al, 2006). These papers demonstrate that the amount of reciprocity declines significantly with respect to the manipulated social distance. Our concept of social connection, however, is different from social distances discussed above in that the social distance in these papers measure social closeness between donors and recipients, but social connection in our paper reflects social relations between donors and beneficiaries. Therefore, while in the previous works it is difficult to distinguish the role of social distance in investing and returning behavior, our design clearly shows that social relations affect both the target and the amount of indirect reciprocal behavior. In fact, the social distance between donors and recipients remain ex-ante the same in our experiment. Our paper is structured as the follows: Section 2 lays out our experimental design and procedures; Section 3 describes the theoretical predictions; Section 4 presents the experimental results; Section 5 discusses possible explanations for our results, and proposes our explanation based on endogenous group formation. Section 6 concludes.2. Experimental design and procedures2.1 Experimental designThe basic design is similar to the investment game but with indirect reward (Dufwenberg et al. 2001, Guth et al. 2001, Buchan et al. 2002). There are two groups of subjects: Group A play the role of donors/beneficiaries (A) and group B play the role of recipients. Their role is fixed during the experiment.In the Baseline Treatment, subjects in group A and group B receive an endowment of 30 RMB and 10 RMB, respectively. In stage 1, each subject in the A group (Ai) plays the role of donor and decides how much of the 30 RMB she wants to transfer to a randomly and anonymously paired subject in group B (Bi). Any amounts offered Xi are tripled by the experimenter and sent to the paired subject. In stage 2, the recipient Bi will be randomly and anonymously repaired with another subject in the A group (Ak). Without knowing Aks transfer decision in stage 1, Bi decides how to split his total wealth, i.e., the sum of his initial endowment plus the tripled amount he received, between himself and Ak. The amount Bi sent to Ak is denoted by Yi. We can see that each subject in group A plays both the role of donor in stage 1 and beneficiary in stage 2, but matched with different subject B in these two stages. For instance, the beneficiary Ak is paired with Bk in stage 1 and makes transfer Xk, but receives repayment Yi from another Bi in stage 2, as Figure 1 illustrates. [Insert Figure 1]The Friend Treatment is similar to the Baseline Treatment, except that in stage 2 Bi will learn whether Ai and Ak are friends after receiving Xi and before repaying Yi. However, it is public information that none of the subjects in A group knows about the friendship status during the game. Figure 2 illustrates the design. [Insert Figure 2]The Messages Treatment differs from the Baseline Treatment in that after Ai makes a transfer in stage 1, she has the option to send a structured message to Bi with the content Please be kind to Ak. The message will cost Ai 1 RMB. Ak doesnt know whether Bi receives a message. Figure 3 illustrates the design.[Insert Figure 3]To collect enough data with reasonable cost, and to address the potential problem that agents may need some experience to actually understand the game (Charness and Kuhn, 2010), in each treatment the subjects play the same game six times with different counterparties, while keeping the composition of group A and group B fixed. We make sure (the subjects also knew it) that no subject could be re-matched with the same subject at a later point in the session. To avoid potential learning effect and strategic reputation-building, the amount Yi was never revealed to Ai and Ak, and so there was no feedback on group As payoff during the experiment. 2.2 Experimental proceduresThe experiment sessions were conducted in Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE), China, in June 2012. A total of 84 individuals participated in the three treatments, and each session has 28 subjects. Sessions took about one hour. Half of the subjects were recruited from two students clubs (henceforth club members), with 21 subjects coming from the chorus club and 21 subjects from the orchestra club. Subjects in the same club knew each other well and were naturally occurring friends.  In each treatment, clubs members were assigned to group A, corresponding to the role of donors/beneficiaries. The remaining 42 subjects (henceforth non-club participants) were recruited by posting notices on campus intranet discussion board and had recipients designation (group B) in each treatment. Most participants are undergraduates at SWUFE. Most of them have taken introductory economics, but no one has prior experience with an investment game. To control the possible information leaking among participants in different treatments, we ran three sessions simultaneously, each corresponding to one treatment.We recruit naturally occurring friends to form group A mainly because of Friend Treatment. As Buchan et al. (2006) demonstrate, a laboratory group formation manipulation does not work for Chinese subjects because of the collectivist cultural inclination. Therefore, bringing naturally occurring social relations to the laboratory is more convincing in our setting. The experimental sessions were run manually. For each treatment, 14 club members and 14 non-club participants were equally allocated to the group A room and group B room, with each club contributing the same number of participants in the group A room. To implement the Friend Treatment, we first put all club members and non-club participants in one single room. The 14 non-club participants were seated in the middle of the classroom, and the two club members were seated in the two sides of the room, respectively. To make it more credible that friendship is not the outcome of laboratory manipulation, a randomly chosen member from each club said Hello, we are from the university chorus (orchestra) club to the non-club participants on behalf of his/her club.In each room A and room B, subjects were randomly assigned an identification number and sat in the assigned place. They received a specific instruction (see Appendix A) that illustrated the game with figures and numerical examples. Participants were asked to complete a numerical example quiz to make sure that they completely understood the game. The experiment formally began at that point. We first describe the procedure of the Baseline Treatment. Experimenters used decision record forms and envelops to communicate role As and Bs decisions to each other in a double-blind procedure. Each subject in group A first played the role of donor and wrote down his/her transfer to B in the decision record form and put the form into the envelop. Experimenters then collected the envelopes and delivered them to the experimenters in group B room who tripled the amounts sent, placed the forms back into the envelopes, and distributed the envelops to the matched subject in group B. Upon receiving transfers, each subject in group B wrote down his/her decision on the repayment in the form, and put the form into the envelop again. Experimenters then collected the envelopes and gave them to the research assistant in the control room who recorded all the decisions by participant identification number in isolation. In the Friend Treatment, after the recipient received the decision record form from the paired donor, he/she was informed privately by the experimenter about whether the donor and the re-paired beneficiary were friends, but not about which club they were from. To send the message in the Messages Treatment, in the group A room, two additional notes were distributed to each donor after they completed the decision record forms. One note was blank, and the other was written with the sentence Please be kind to Ak . The donor decided which note to be delivered to the recipient together with the decision record form in the sealed envelope. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a short post-experiment questionnaire for their demographic information. After completing the questionnaire, a random round was chosen to calculate their final payment. Participants were paid with a sealed envelope which contained the cash. Including the 25 RMB show-up fee, each subject earned on average 48 RMB (about 8 USD). This is a little higher than the average wage of 25 RMB an hour for jobs on this campus.Theoretical predictionsOur analysis focuses on the reciprocate behavior of the recipient, i.e. the role B. We outline predictions of related theories on Bs behavior. Standard homo economicus theory, which assumes that all individuals are only concerned about personal payoffs, predicts that the recipient should repay zero to the beneficiary. Besides, complete anonymity guarantees that there is no reputation concern. This could serve as our benchmark hypothesis.Selfishness hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi , will be zero for all transfers in all treatments.The selfishness hypothesis is often violated in the standard investment game (bilateral interaction) as recipients will return a significant amount of money to donors. There are several explanations of this direct reciprocity. Among these major theories, outcome-based social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002), type-based reciprocity (Levine, 1998) and guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) have the potential to be extended to the setting of indirect reciprocity. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop the models of intention-based reciprocity, based on the premise that people like to return those who help them and punish those who hurt them. However, it is not immediately clear how to formally apply these models to our setting, because by definition the beneficiary does not take any action that affects the payoffs of the recipient, so there is no intention to be revealed. In effects, if we insist on theories of intention-based reciprocity, then the derived theoretical predictions would be the same as the selfishness hypothesis that the repayment would be zero.Outcome-based social preferences assume that individuals are altruistic and so care about fairness in various forms, e.g., the equity of final payoff distributions, social welfare. This motivation may affect the level of Yi because as Ai gave more to Bi, the payoff distribution is more uneven, and this inequality may motivate Bi to transfer more. However, this theory does not predict significant impact of friendship, because friendship status does not directly affect payoff distributions. This theory may predict more transfer by Bi with message since a costly message would change the payoff distribution, but the change should be marginal since it only costs Ai 1 RMB. Outcome-based social preferences hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, does not vary with friendship status but may increase marginally with message. There are abundant experimental evidence that expressed preferences might affect reciprocating behavior (Charness and Rabin, 2005; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) stress that people may exhibit guilt aversion, i.e., people strive to live up to others (selfish or not) expectations so as to avoid guilt. In our setting, the recipient might respond to the expectation of donors or beneficiaries. However, only in the Message Treatment the donor has the opportunity to directly express her hope. Thus, if a message is delivered to the recipient, he forms the belief that the donor expects him to repay more to the beneficiary. Consequently, he will repay more to the beneficiary. In the Friend Treatment, since Ai did not learn about her social relations with Ak, between this treatment and the Baseline Treatment there should be no difference in Ais expressed expectations, and so there is no reason for the recipient to give more. Guilt aversion hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, will be higher if the donor sends a message but will not vary in other treatments. Type-based reciprocity assumes that people are either selfish or altruistic. Selfish type always cares about self interest, and altruistic type also cares about others welfare conditioning on other people being altruistic as well. If Ai gave a large amount to Bi, then it is a clear signal of altruistic type. Similarly, sending a costly message to do a favor to Ak is also a strong signal of altruistic type. However, these signals do not directly reveal Aks type and so Yi should not depend on these factors.Most researchers in social and economic networks view social ties as the structure in which players interact with each other (Jackson, 2008). However, in the view of some sociologists, social ties might serve as a device to signaling unobserved characteristics (Podolny, 1993). Social status may flow through social ties, thus a players ties to higher-status actors enhance the others perception of her prestige. In our setup, this logic would imply that recipients might perceive that a friend of a nice person is more likely a kind guy. Therefore, if we make a further assumption that friends are more likely to be of the same type, e.g., recipients treat the payoff of a group of friends as a whole, then we might obtain an extended type-based reciprocity hypothesis that predicts that Yi depends on the friendship status. Type-based hypothesis: the amount of repayment, Yi, does not vary with friendship status and message. Extended Type-based hypothesis: If we assume that friends are more likely to be of the same type, then Yi will be higher if Xi is large and Ai and Ak are friends.4. ResultsFigure 4 graphs player Ais and Bis transfer across the three treatments. There exists a natural monotonic relationship in all treatments: the more player Ai gave, the more player Bi was likely to send back. There are about 17%, 20% and 15% of the observed As transfer equalizing zero under the three treatments, respectively. Conditioning on receiving positive transfer from A, about 16%, 19% and 21% of the observed Bs repayment were zero under the three treatments. These results suggest roughly the percentage of pure selfish behavior in our observations. There are two players in Baseline Treatment and one player in Friend Treatment who consistently gave 30 RMB, which was their entire endowment. We can infer from Figure 4:Result 1. A significant number of subjects exhibit pure indirect reciprocal behavior.Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate player Ais and player Bis average transfer by round for the three treatments, respectively. In general, there is no clear trend across rounds, suggesting that our random re-matching and anonymous interaction might successfully prevent learning. In Figure 5 we see that player Ais transfer is on average higher in the Baseline Treatment than in the other two treatments. However, in Figure 3 we do not see such a big different in terms of player Bis repayment. Figure 7 further summarizes the amount of player Bis repayment across treatments and situations. In the overall group, we see that the average Bi repayment is 7.2 in Baseline Treatment, 6.7 in Friend Treatment and only 3.1 in Message Treatment. The important message comes from the Friend group and Message group. The Friend group includes observations from the Friend Treatment only, but these observations are divided by whether Ai and Ak were friends or not. If they were not friends, the average repayment was only 5.4, as opposed to 8.7 when they were friends. Given that Ai and Ak were friends, we further divide the sample by whether Ais transfer is higher or lower than 5, the median of all observed As transfer. We observe that when Ai gave high transfer, Bis average repayment was as high as 16.5, whereas provided with low Ai transfer Bi on average reciprocated only about 5, not very different from the situation that Ai and Ak were not friends. Similarly, the Message group includes only observations from the Message Treatment. The amount of Bis repayment is slightly higher when Ai sent a message, and this increase occurs mostly when Ai gave high transfer. Overall, we observe a strong friend effect and weak message effect.We first examine the friend effect in more details. Table 1 reports the results of formal econometric analysis using observations from Friend Treatment only. The dependent variable is Bis repayment, and the independent variables include Ais transfer, a dummy variable Friend indicating that Ai and Ak were friends and the interaction term between the two. Whether controlling for the possibly nonlinearity in the transfer-repayment relationship does not affect our treatment effect. Notice that there is a single Ai player who always gave 30, the maximum amount possible. We exclude observations related to this subject to avoid results being driven by outliers. Across all columns we observe significantly positive effect of Ais transfer. For every unit increase in Ais transfer, Bis repayment increases by about 0.9 unit in Column (1)--(3) and 0.6 in Column (4), significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. In Column (1) we only add Ais transfer and the friend dummy. However, we do not observe that Bis repayment is higher if Ai and Ak were friends. This result remains even after we control for round dummy and subject dummy in Column (2) and (3). Overall we do not observe significant effect of simply being friends. However, when we interact Ais transfer with the Friend dummy in Column (4), we get a significant interaction term. If Ais transfer increases by 1 RMB, then the difference of Bis repayment under the case of being friend and not friend will increase by 0.623 RMB. Based on Table 1, we make the further crucial observation:Result 2. If a donor has transferred more to a recipient, the latter will repay more to a beneficiary who is a friend of the donor than to the one who is a stranger.This suggests that the effect of being friend crucially depends on whether Ai has given a sufficiently large transfer, i.e., released enough kindness. The more Ai gave, the more likely that Bi will reciprocate to Ais friend. In fact, when Ai gave only a very small amount, being friends even decreases Bis giving by 2.433, although this is not statistically significant. Now we turn to examine the effect of messages. Table 2 reports the estimation result of a regression that is similar to the one reported in Table 1, but uses observations from Message Treatment only and includes the dummy variable Message instead of Friend to represent whether a message is received. In this treatment, about 46% of the subjects chose to send a costly message.We again observe significantly positive impact of Ais transfer on Bis repayment, but the magnitude of the impact is slightly smaller than that in the Friend Treatment. Surprisingly, the fact that Ai sent a costly message that requires Bi to treat Ak nicer does not generate any significant effect on Bs transfer. Although the estimates of the variable Message and its interaction term with Ais transfer are all positive, these estimates are not statistically significant. Considering Table 2 and Figure 4, we observe:Result 3. Receiving messages does not have any significant effects on the reciprocal acts.We would like to compare outcomes in the Friend and Message Treatments to Baseline. Simply having the opportunity to learn about the friendship status and send a message could change player Ais and Bis behavior in some way. For instance, learning that Ai and Ak are not friend could be different from knowing nothing about the connections between them. While the former signals social relations, the latter situation is neutral. The fact that Ai did not send a message when he/she could may signal to B about Ais type, but not allowing Ai to send a message does not reveal this. Table 3 reports the estimation result. In this regression we cannot control for subject dummy because we have different subjects across different treatments. The subject dummy and any treatment effect cannot be separately indentified. Column (1) and (2) of Table 3 includes observations from Friend Treatment and the Baseline, whereas Column (3) and (4) compare Message Treatment to the Baseline. To avoid being driven by outliers, our estimation drops observations related to those Ai who gave 30 RMB. In addition to the Friend and Message dummy variables, we include Friend Treatment and Message Treatment to indicate that the observation is from the corresponding treatment. Column (1) suggests that overall Bs repayment in the Friend Treatment is not significantly different from the Baseline after controlling for Ais transfer. When we additionally add the Friend dummy in Column (2), we learn that knowing Ai and Ak are friend significantly increases Bs transfer by 2.601 RMB compared to the Baseline, but knowing they are not friends does not generate different result from the Baseline. Similarly, in Column (3) and Column (4) we also do not observe significant difference of the Message Treatment from the Baseline both in terms of the average transfer level and whether there was a message sent. This is consistent with the finding on Message Treatment alone. 5. DiscussionsOur estimations demonstrate the significant impact of friendship status and insignificant influence of messages. The magnitude of the impact of friendship status on recipients repayment crucially depends on donors transfer behavior in the first place, with higher Ais transfer leading to larger impact of friendship status. However, the effect of message is not significant and also does not vary with Ais transfer. We also have the robust finding that Ais transfer significantly increases Bis transfer in all treatments. These results provide important empirical evidence to understand the motivations of indirect reciprocal behavior in our setting. The fact that Ais transfer is strongly correlated with Bis repayment under all treatments makes it clear that the recipients reciprocal acts can be extended to an anonymous third party who didnt help him before. Therefore, the selfishness hypothesis is rejected. On the other hand, outcome-based social preferences can explain this transfer-repayment relationship pretty well because higher Xi makes the payoff distribution more unequal. However, this theory cannot explain the significant impact of friendship status between Ai and Ak, because this has no impacts on the players outcome distribution. Besides, this theory also makes the prediction that messages have marginal positive effects on repayment, which is not supported in our results. Therefore, the outcome-based social preferences hypothesis is not fully supported. Guilt aversion model has the potential to explain the significant effects of friendship status. Noteworthy, if we assume that there is a social norm that expects the recipient to repay more to a friend of a kind donor, this expectation as well as recipients beliefs of this expectation might affect indirect reciprocal acts. However, this explanation implies that even the implicit expectations derived from contextual social norms matter. If it is the case, donors explicitly expressed expectations would be more salient as expected. Our Message Treatment thus provides a perfect setting to test guilt aversion hypothesis. Though we didnt directly elicit the players first-order and second-order belief, sending a structured message clearly indicates the donors expectations in our setting. However, the impact of sending a message is insignificantly different from zero. Hence, the guilt-aversion hypothesis receives limited support from our data. This casts doubts on the role of guilt aversion in the social situation of indirect interactions. The original version of type-based hypothesis suggests that the reciprocal behavior is affected by whether the other party is of altruistic or selfish type. Thus, it predicts that repayments will be the same across all treatments since the beneficiaries have no chance to signal their types. This is not supported by our results. However, the extended type-based hypothesis that assumes that members of the same club tend to have the same selfish or altruistic type is consistent with the significant impact of friendship status. However, the consistency of our results and the theoretical predictions doesnt lead to the full confidence in this hypothesis. Clearly, we need to test whether the conjectured channel is valid before accepting the reasoning. We would like to know whether there are significant differences in the within and between-group correlations of donors/beneficiaries actual transfer behavior. We run a one-way analysis-of-variance on Xi across two clubs in the Friend Treatment. The calculated between-group mean squared error is 1.2 while the within-group mean squared error is 66.2. Hence, most of the variation of Xi comes from within-group difference. Even though it is possible that subjects in the role of recipient might perceive that friendship signals the similar type, there is no evidence that members of the same club act as if they are of the same type. Therefore, we think that neither version of type-based hypothesis can provide a convincing explanation of the strong effect of social connection.  The most prominent models of reciprocity in bilateral interactions, including intention-based, guilt-aversion, and type-based, all rely on modeling the agents belief system, e.g., whether the second mover believes in the first movers good intention, kind type, or avoids her disappointment. But our experimental results suggest that this approach could not be naturally extended to the context of multilateral interaction, belief system might play a minor role in indirect reciprocal behavior.The most salient observations from our experiment are that strong social connections between the donor and the beneficiary have a significant positive impact on indirect reciprocity. Unfortunately, none of the prominent theories of social preferences can provide satisfactory explanation. Malmendier and Schmidt (2011) propose a theoretical model to explain the reciprocating behavior in the presence of negative externalities. Following the ideas in the anthropological and sociological literature that reciprocity is an internalized social norm, they extend standard outcome-based social preferences by endogenizing the reference group. Decision maker is assumed to care about the weighted sum of ones own consumption utility and others utility, but the weights attached to others welfare are conditional on peoples actions. If their actions are nicer than expected, then the weights attached to their welfare are higher. Our preferred explanation is an extension of Malmendier and Schmidts (2011) idea of endogenous reference group. We assume conditional outcome-based altruism, in which conditional on the others previous actions, decision maker derives utilities from increasing the others welfare. In our set-up, we assume that these welfare weights are monotonically related to the degree of social connections. Social connections should have two important features: First, social connections can be endogenous to actions such as gift giving. In our setting, an unexpected large amount of Ais giving strengthens the social connection between Ai and Bi. Second, social connections have the property of transitivity. In other words, if Ai is socially close to Bi, and Ai socially close to Ak, then Bi feels socially close to Ak. This transitivity creates a sense of in-group and out-group bias based on social networks. The donors large transfer increases the level of recipients intrinsic care about donors. Knowing the donor and the beneficiary were friends, the recipient raises his care about beneficiaries as well. As a result, recipients are more willing to repay to the beneficiary. Literally, a friend of a friend of mine is also my friend.6. ConclusionIn this paper, we have conducted a laboratory experiment to examine the behavioral motivations underlying indirect reciprocity. In our experimental one-shot indirect investment game, the donor and the beneficiary is not the same person, the social connections between the donor and the beneficiary might vary, and the donor might have the opportunity to send a message to the recipient to signal her expectations. We introduce real social relations in our experiment by using naturally occurring friends to proxy different degree of social distance. The double-blind design warrants anonymity in interactions and rules out any strategic incentives underlying indirect reciprocity. We provide clear evidence for the existence of pure indirect reciprocal behavior. Moreover, we show that social connections significantly affect recipients repayment. However, they operate in a conditional way in that close social ties pay off only if the donor has been kind to the recipient. On the other hand, expectations play a relatively minor role in affecting the reciprocating behavior in our experiment. This neglects the role of belief system that is the driving force in most prominent theories of reciprocity in indirect reciprocal behavior.We derive hypothesis from competing models of social preferences, including outcome-based theories, intentions-based theories, guilt-aversion theories, and type-based theories. However, it is shown that none of them succeeds in providing satisfactory explanations. Therefore, based on the idea of conditional altruism in Malmendier and Schmidt (2011), we propose an explanation based on in-group and out-group differences of social preferences but with the group formation endogenously determined by transfers and group status flow along social ties. Most human interactions are embedded into social networks, and there is a large body of literature investigating the role of social ties in economic interactions. Our results suggest that, in addition to facilitating information transmission and risk sharing, etc., social connections play an important role in determining the target and strength of reciprocal behavior. Thus, an implication of our work is that social connections significantly expand the scope of reciprocal behavior, consequently sustain mutual cooperation.In our experiment, we only examine a certain type of naturally occurring social relations: club membership. It would be interesting to learn the impact of different types of social ties. Our main focus is the recipients indirect reciprocal behavior, thus, the implication for social efficiency, i.e., the impact of social relations on the donors transfer behavior, to a large extent remains unclear. On the other hand, as we mentioned before, we use naturally occurring friendship to overcome the failure of commonly used group formation procedure in China due to the collectivist cultural inclination (Buchan et al, 2006). To what extent the culture contributes to the significant role of social ties in reciprocal behavior still waits for future research.References:Alexander, Richard D (1987) The Biology of Moral Systems, Aldine de Cruyter, New York.Ashraf, Nava., Iris Bohnet and Nikita Piankov (2006) Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness, Experimental Economics, 9, 193-208.Berg, Joyce., John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (1995) Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122-142.Bicchieri, Cristina., Erte Xiao, and Ryan Muldoon (2011) Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, But Trusting is Not, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 10, 170-187.Bolton, Gary and Axel Ockenfels (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition, American Economic Review, 90, 166-193.Buchan, Nancy, Rachel Croson, and Robyn Dawes (2002) Swift Neighbors and Persistent Strangers: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity in Social Exchange, American Journal of Sociology, 108, 168-206.Buchan, Nancy, and Rachel Croson (2004) The Boundaries of Trust: Own and Others Actions in the US and China, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 55, 485-504.Buchan Nancy, Eric J. Johnson, and Rachel Croson (2006) Lets Get Personal: An International Examination of the Influence of Communication, Culture and Social Distance on Other Regarding Preferences, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 373-398.Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin (2002) Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-869.------- (2005) Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 151-169.Charness, Gary and Dufwenberg, Martin (2006) Promises and Partnership, Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601.Charness, Gary and Uri Gneezy. (2008) Whats in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68, 29-35.Charness, Gary and Peter Kuhn (2010) Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? 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Reciprocal exchange: A self-sustaining system, American Economic Review, 86, 830-851. Levine, David (1998) Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment, Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 593-622.Malmendier, Ulrike and Klaus M. Schmidt (2011) You Owe Me, Working Paper.Maximiano, Sandra.; Randolph Sloot, and Joep Sonnemans (2013) Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control, Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 41-60.McCabe, Kevin, Stephen J. Rassenti, and Vernon L. Smith (1998) Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 10-24.McCabe, Kevin A., Mary L. Rigdon and Vernon L. Smith (2003) Positive Reciprocity and Intentions in Trust Games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52, 267-275.Nowak, Martin A. and Karl Sigmund (1998) Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring. Nature, 393, 573-577.-------- (2005) Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity, Nature, 437, 1291-1298.Podolny, Joel M (1993) A Status-Based Model of Market Competition, American Journal of Sociology, 98, 829-872.Rabin, Matthew (1993) Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.Seinen, Ingrid and Arthur, Schram (2006) Social Status and Group Norms: Indirect Reciprocity in a Helping Experiment. European Economic Review, 50, 581-602.Strassmair, Christina (2009) Can Intentions Spoil the Kindness of a Gift?- An Experimental Study, Working Paper.Song Fei, C. Bram Cadsby, and Yunyun Bi. (2012) Trust, Reciprocity, and Guanxi in China: An Experimental Investigation, Management and Organization Review, 8, 397-421.Table 1 Friend TreatmentDependent Variable: Bi's TransferIndependent Variable(1)(2)(3)(4)Ai's transfer0.884***0.908***0.904***0.572**[0.216][0.214][0.184][0.225]Friend2.3072.0610.688-2.433[1.823][1.799][1.328][1.854]Friend*Ai's transfer0.623**[0.285]Constant1.4660.916-4.945***-3.638**[1.384][2.033][1.583][1.509]Round dummy"""Subject dummy""Adjusted R-squared0.2720.3060.7610.787Observations78787878Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 2 Message TreatmentDependent Variable: Bi's TransferIndependent Variable(1)(2)(3)(4)Ai's transfer0.251**0.251**0.188*0.135[0.109][0.103][0.094][0.112]Message0.4240.4290.219-0.283[0.769][0.774][0.732][1.139]Message*Ai's transfer0.096[0.204]Constant1.632**1.2740.5890.987[0.790][1.010][1.256][1.243]Round dummy"""Subject dummy""Adjusted R-squared0.0990.1680.4450.581Observations84848484Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table 3 Compare Friend and Message Treatment to BaselineDependent Variable: Bi's TransferIndependent Variable(1)(2)(3)(4)Ai's transfer0.636***0.628***0.438***0.438***[0.140][0.139][0.106][0.107]Friend Treatment1.7980.735[2.304][2.275]Friend2.601*[1.323]Message Treatment-2.601-2.665[1.673][1.798]Message0.134[1.078]Constant1.4841.6753.443**3.434**[1.925][1.920][1.654][1.663]Round dummy""""Adjusted R-squared0.1480.1970.1870.224Observations152152158158Note: Standard errors clustered by subjects are reported in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We cannot control for subject dummy in these regressions because different treatments consist of different subjects, and so the treatment effect is not identifiable if we control for subject dummy.Figure 1: Design of the Baseline TreatmentFigure 2: Design of the Friend TreatmentFigure 3: Design of the Message TreatmentFigure 4: Player Ais and Bis Transfer SummaryFigure 5: Player Ais Average Transfer by Round Figure 6: Player Bis Average Transfer by Round Figure 7: Player Bis Average Transfer by Treatment Preliminary and please do not circulate. We thank the valuable comments from Bram Cadsby, Colin Camerer, Kenneth Chan, Changxia Ke, Matthew Rabin, Jason Shachat, Fei Song, as well as the attendants of seminars in SWUFE and Sun Yat-sen University. Cox (2004), Ashraf et al (2006) have considered reciprocity as actions conditional on the actions or intentions of others, thus distinguished it from conventional other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Assessing the relative strength of these two types of preferences, however, is not our main concern.  Finan and Schechter (2011) show that social preferences play a role in vote-buying behavior in Paraguay. In particular, the politicians will target on reciprocal individuals.  In this experiment, we use naturally occurring friendship to depict social connections. It is reasonable to presume that the social distance between friends is shorter than that between strangers. Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) have conducted a repeated helping game similar to Nowak and Sigmund (1998) and Seinen and Schram (2006). By controlling the information feedbacks in the experiment, they provide evidence for pure indirect reciprocity. In effects, the experiment by Bicchieri et al (2011) shows that there is no difference in agents beliefs regarding trusting friends and trusting strangers. However, in their experiment it seems that there is a norm of reciprocity conditional on social distances. After discussion with the instructors of the clubs and the members, we confirm that there are many group activities within each club, hence we could infer that they are both quite cohesive. Besides, their group identities are quite similar (both music clubs) in front of the outside students. The demographic characteristics of these two clubs are also similar. Some subjects may have the strategic motivations in interactions, such as encouraging the donor (recipient) to transfer (repay) in the future, or group reputation concerns even in the absence of disclosure of group identity. But it should be limited because relative to the size of the group, the behavior of a single subject has limited influence. We also do not observe any decline of reciprocating behavior, indicating no evidence for this motivation as a major force.  Maximiano et al. (2013) study indirect reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment. Their focus is whether the separation of firm owners (beneficiaries) and managers (donors) affects the workers effort contribution. Their results support the hypothesis that workers treat the firm as a whole, thus ignore that the managers payoff is independent of the reciprocal behavior. However, in their work this hypothesis is derived from the fact that the owner is the one who affords the cost of gift, thus it might be natural that workers consider the owner as a donor. It is useful to compare our results with previous studies on indirect reciprocity. In Dufwenberg et al. (2001) 18% of donors sent zero amount, but 9% of recipients returned positive amount conditional on receiving positive transfer. However, Guth et al. (2001) report that 55% of donors sent zero amount, and over 70% of recipients didnt return anything conditional on positive investment. We have also tried using the transfer ratio=Bis transfer/(Ais transfer*3) as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients all have the same sign as reported here, but they are not statistically significant. It is also consistent with Song et al (2012). Noteworthy, Cox et al (2007) developed a tractable model which incorporates the emotional state. In their model, when treated nicely by another, the agents emotional state becomes positive and he gain utility from the others payoffs, and vice versa. 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hFo(UhFOJQJhFOJQJo(h-OJQJo(hFhFOJQJcould not shed lights on the role of social connections. As a complementary, our findings might suggest that the target of the influences of the emotional state is based on certain social networks. Closer social connections are more likely to be affected by the emotion state. Ellingsen et al. (2010) investigated guilt aversion in bilateral interactions controlling for consensus effects, and concluded that guilt aversion appears to play a relatively minor role in their experiments. Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009) suggested that type-based model is more convincing in explaining their experiment results on pure indirect reciprocity. However, their focus is on As transfer. 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